To be or not to be [Nietzsche]?

While I might have dropped off the face of the earth, such a trip was only temporary. This post consists of a paper that I presented to the ethics course I attended this semester. I appreciate Nietzsche's work, and, to be honest, if I rejected theism, I would follow Nietzsche's thoughts. For myself, I see the choices for religious beliefs consisting of embracing either theism or Nietzsche's philosophy. I hope that the work is helpful, and, as always, I would appreciate any feedback.

Believe This or I Will Beat You Up: Nietzschean Conflict Resolution

Introduction

 “What lustrums, what sacred games show we have to devise? Is not the magnitude of this deed too great for us? Shall we not ourselves have to become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it?”[1] Here, one begins to see the logical conclusions flowing from the Madman’s thoughts. In Nietzsche’s parable of the Madman, Nietzsche accepts the premise of atheism as being true. From this, Nietzsche shows that one must wipe away everything dependent upon Christianity, including morality.

Following Christian morality results in the safety and security of individuals as a secondary benefit of restraining people’s appetites. Since Nietzsche deems Christianity and its moral system to be false, he must find some other guided rule whereby to live. Nietzsche finds the will to act as the guiding ethical principle for his system. Essentially, one wills to do what one desires, thereby establishing what is good and evil by utilizing the self as the appraiser of values. How can Nietzsche’s ethical system adjudicate between two willful individuals whose actions are antithetical to each other? Ultimately, one should reject Nietzsche’s morality due to its axiological failure to provide adequate adjudication between two conflicting, mutually exclusive actions.

Argument

Nietzsche conceives that Christianity committed the most heinous crime against humanity by propagating the lie that all men are created equal. This lie serves no other end than to elevate the weak and handicap the strong. “The truth is that there is no other alternative for gods: either they are will to power – in which case they are national gods – or incapacity for power – in which case they have to be good....”[2] Nietzsche here affirms that people project their values upon the conception of God and that only two genuine possibilities for this conception of God exist. Apart from God, “it is mere individual desire. That is thought to serve as a basis for action.”[3]

Nietzsche sees humanity as broken into the categories of slave and master. Equality only exists within the categories, but never between the categories, as

the ability and obligation to exercise prolonged gratitude and prolonged revenge – both only within the circles of equals, – artfulness in retaliation, refinement of the idea in friendship, a certain necessity to have enemies (as outlets for the emotions of envy, quarrelsome, arrogance – in fact, in order to be a good friend): all these are typical characteristics of the noble morality....[4]

 Perhaps one is reminded of Japan during the peak of the samurai. During that time, Japanese customs stratified the society, with samurai falling into the upper category. Protocol dictated how one should interact between classes. Therefore, samurais treated each other as equals, but a samurai offended by a commoner could take the head of the offender. Alternatively, one may think of the relationship between Batman and Joker, hero and nemesis. Under Nietzsche’s understanding, as power holds value, the quality directly corresponds to the relationship between the powers of the individual. The greater the disparity between the power of the wills, the greater the inequality between the individuals. Thus, one may still deem people at cross-purposes as equals within a Nietzschean system.

An unsatisfactory position arises by admitting that the Nietzschean system deems two people who are equally willful in antithetical purposes as both be right. This affirmation leads to a contradiction of how one should act. Therefore, either the world is logically inconsistent or the Nietzschean system fails to correspond to reality.

Objections

One possible objection to the thesis of this examination may state that Nietzsche does give the means of adjudication, namely, he that prevails is right. Should an apparent stalemate arise, the individuals should continue to will.[5] To ask more than this simply seeks what does not exist. Moreover, Nietzsche simply gives motivation to the will by formulating his doctrine of eternal recurrence, which states that everything happening now has already happened, and will continue to happen, an infinite number of times.[6]

One may object in a second fashion, stating that if neither prevails, then both should assure mutual destruction. Essentially, both parties should will until neither party is left. Furthermore, one may claim that this situation does not fall subject to valuations of rightness and wrongness as far as individuals are concerned, only that one should act with disregard to the consequences.

Responses to Objections

First, one may respond to the objection claiming that potency determines morality by stating that potency stands counterintuitive as a means of determining who and what is right. Intuitively, potency bears less upon the morality of an act than Nietzsche emphasizes. The matter of potency remains a question better answered within the realm of ability rather than morality. Scripture many times addresses the willfulness of individuals by deeming such actions sinful. One specific example consists of Uzzah willfully putting forth his hand to catch the Ark of the Covenant and keep it from falling off the oxen cart.[7] God struck Uzzah dead for his violation of the law. Second, David willfully took Bathsheba in an adulterous affair. God declared David guilty of willful disobedience to God’s law.[8] The third and final example demonstrates that some willfulness falls within the will of God. This third example consists of Jesus crucified. He submitted to this crucifixion willfully, and one seems hard-pressed to make the case that a coward or sissy undertook such action.

The second objection does not address that Nietzsche fails to provide why someone ought to will in such a way: if God is dead, then all is permissible; therefore, what constrains one to conform to any moral system? Judgment on matters becomes mere opinion that binds nothing. If one wills one way, a second wills another way, and a third wills to will nothing, then these contradictions find no resolution within Nietzsche’s system. Lastly, Nietzsche gives no account of those actions deemed good when done contrary to a person’s will, such as saving the life of someone attempting suicide.[9] Thus, while the will plays a significant aspect in a person’s life, Nietzsche’s emphasis upon the will still leads him unguided and deficient.

Conclusion

Nietzsche’s system remains impotent to affirm what is right or wrong, which would thereby adjudicate between two conflicting parties. Even such acts as rape and torture seem to find no denunciation. While Nietzsche speaks of a higher morality whereby he passes judgment upon established morality, Nietzsche struggles to find grounds for why one ought to follow this morality, providing only an appeal to desires as the key motivator.

Second, while one may cling ostensibly to the hardened holdout that Nietzsche has carved into the world of morality, one may state that the case for overturning Nietzsche’s morality has not fully proven the deficiency of the system, only that other systems exist that can describe the same actions. While some truth may persist in such a response, Nietzsche’s system directly rests upon the premise that God does not exist. With positive arguments for God’s existence (such as the ontological argument and the Kal­am cosmological argument), one can make a more extensive case for the rejection of Nietzsche’s system of morality. If Nietzsche is right, then God does not exist. God does exist. Therefore, Nietzsche is wrong. If Nietzsche is wrong, then his morality has no basis. If his morality has no basis, then no one ought to follow his morality. Thus, no one ought to follow Nietzsche’s system of morality.

Therefore, Nietzsche’s system should be abandoned. The system suffers from both internal and external flaws that leave it untenable, should God exist. Good reasons exist that God exists. With these arguments in hand, one must willfully make this abandonment of Nietzsche’s morality due to its axiological failure to proffer forth some means of resolution for the equipollence between contrary and competing actions.

Bibliography

Banner, Michael. Christian Ethics: A Brief History. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.

Cavalier, Robert J., James Gouinlock, and James P. Sterba, eds. Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989.

Ferry, Luc. A Brief History of Thought: A Philosophical Guide to Living. Translated by Theo Cuffe. New York: Harper Perennial, 2011.

Froese, Katrin. Rousseau and Nietzsche: Toward and Aesthetic Morality. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001.

Heidegger, Martin. Nietzsche. Translated by David Farrell Krell, 4 vols. San Francisco: Harper and Row Publishers, 1979.

Irwin, William, Mark T. Conard, and Aeon J. Skoble, eds. The Simpsons and Philosophy: The D’oh! Of Homer. Chicago: Open Court, 2001.

Leiter, Brian and Neil Sinhababu, eds. Nietzsche and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Leiter, Brian. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Morality. London: Routledge, 2002.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Antichrist. Translated by H. L. Mencken. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1918. Kindle.

———. Beyond Good and Evil. Translated by Helen Zimmern. The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche. Kindle.

———. The Dawn of Day. Translated by John McFarland Kennedy. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1911. Kindle.

———. The Joyful Wisdom. Translated by Thomas Common, Paul V. Cohn, and Maude D. Petre. The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, edited by Oscar Levy, vol. 10. Edinburgh: The Darien Press, 1910.

———. Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. Translated by Thomas Common. Kindle.

Wilcox, John T. Truth and Value in Nietzsche: A Study of His Metaethics and Epistemology. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1974.

Willard, Dallas, ed. A Place for Truth: Leading Thinkers Explore Life’s Hardest Questions. Downers Grove: IVP Books, 2010.

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[1]. Frederick Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, trans. by Thomas Common, Paul V. Cohn , and Maude D. Petre, The Complete Works of Frederick Nietzsche, ed. by Oscar Levy (Edinburgh: The Darien Press, 1910), 168.

[2]. Friedrich Nietzsche, Antichrist, trans. by H. L. Mencken (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1918), 9. Kindle.

[3]. Dallas Willard, ed., A Place for Truth: Leading Thinkers Explore Life's Hardest Questions (Downers Grove: IVP Books, 2010), 161.

[4]. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. by Helen Zimmern, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, 123. Kindle.

[5]. In some sense, one may argue that the Nietzschean system falls under deontology rather than consequentialism.

[6]. Luc Ferry, A Brief History of Thought: a Philosophical Guide to Living, trans. by Theo Cuffe (New York: Harper Perennial, 2011), 187.

[7]. 1 Samuel 8:6-8

[8]. 1 Samuel 11:2-5

[9]. Granted, one may respond that the person attempting to commit suicide would be acting favorable to the rest of the world by removing himself or herself from it so that others might flourish. Such an apathetic response runs contrary to natural inclinations.